European Parliament
2024-2029

TEXTS ADOPTED

P10_TA(2026)0342

The need for an EU strategy to counter Islamist entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood network

European Parliament resolution of 8 October 2026 on the need for an EU strategy to counter Islamist entryism and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood network (2026/2868(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to Articles 67, 83, 84, 85, 87 and 317 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Article 21 on non-discrimination, as well as Article 10 on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion,

– having regard to Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin[1],

– having regard to Articles 137 and 138 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[2] (the Financial Regulation),

– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism[3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA[4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice

---

1 OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/43/oj.
2 OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
3 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/2580/oj.
4 OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/794/oj.

Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing Council Decision 2002/187/JHA[5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU[6],

– having regard to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 11 of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA[7],

– having regard to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism[8],

– having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions[9],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament's rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption[10],

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the transparency and accountability of non-governmental organisations funded from the EU budget[11],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 1 April 2025 entitled 'ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy' (COM(2025)0148),

– having regard to Special Report 11/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 7 April 2025 entitled 'Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable',

– having regard to the report entitled 'Muslim Brotherhood and political Islamism in France', made public by the French Ministry of the Interior on 21 May 2025,

– having regard to the resolution adopted by the French National Assembly on 22 January 2026 seeking to include the Muslim Brotherhood movement on the EU list of terrorist organisations, T.A. No 215,

– having regard to the Austrian Symbols Act, as amended in 2018 to prohibit, inter alia, the public use of symbols linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as to the

---

5 OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 138, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1727/oj.
6 OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 56, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1862/oj.
7 OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj.
8 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj.
9 OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 109.
10 OJ C, C/2024/4011, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4011/oj.
11 OJ C, C/2024/5725, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5725/oj.

counterterrorism legislative package adopted in 2021 on religiously motivated extremist associations,

– having regard to the report of the Belgian State security service entitled ‘Intelligence Report 2025’ and the chapter thereof entitled ‘The Muslim Brotherhood: behind the mask of moderation’,

– having regard to the motion adopted by the Dutch Tweede Kamer on 17 March 2026 calling for the prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood and organisations linked to it in the Netherlands,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, in accordance with Article 2 TEU;

B. whereas freedom of religion, freedom of expression and freedom of association are fundamental rights protected by the Treaties and the Charter; whereas these freedoms must not be instrumentalised to cover political strategies aimed at weakening democratic values, public order, equality between women and men or social cohesion;

C. whereas Islam, as a religion, is not inherently political or hostile, and the overwhelming majority of those who observe Islam as a religion reject violence against civilians in the name of Islam; whereas political Islamism must not be presented as synonymous with, or representative of, Islam as such, but, rather, understood as a distinct political phenomenon characterised by the political instrumentalisation of a particular interpretation of Islam; whereas criticism of a political ideology must not be equated with an attack on a religion;

D. whereas the strategy of Islamist entryism relies, in particular, on the organised confusion between Islam as a religion, which falls under freedom of conscience, and political Islam as a societal project, which seeks to produce collective norms, derogatory regimes or community allegiances placed above common law; whereas such a project may contribute to the development of parallel communities and to practices incompatible with democratic principles and EU values, thereby undermining social cohesion and individuals’ ability to participate fully in public life;

E. whereas separatist narratives, systematic victimhood, antisemitism, anti-Christian hatred, hatred of Israel, conspiracy narratives, challenges to secularism, the use of religion as a tool of social control or the contestation of equality between women and men may constitute markers of ideological radicalisation or Islamist influence;

F. whereas, within Islamist ecosystems, the promotion of religious dress among minors may serve as a marker of ideological conformity and as a vector of Islamist influence; whereas such practices may raise concerns regarding the free development of minors, freedom of conscience and equality between women and men;

G. whereas Islamist influence operates through a broad and fragmented ecosystem of associations, foundations and cultural, educational, religious, charitable, university, youth, anti-discrimination or social action structures;

H. whereas the Muslim Brotherhood constitutes the archetype of these transnational Islamist networks; whereas its method relies more on relays, associated structures, slogans, alliances and bodies of evidence than on visible formal membership; whereas this movement carries a political project based on the primacy of religious norms over common law, which is incompatible with democratic principles, the rule of law and equality between citizens;

I. whereas the Council of European Muslims (CEM), formerly the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe, is described by the French Ministry of the Interior as the 'cornerstone of the European structuring' of the Muslim Brotherhood; whereas it is linked to Europe Trust, described as the 'financial arm of the movement' in Europe and registered in the United Kingdom as a charitable organisation; whereas numerous organisations, such as FEMYSO, are linked to the CEM;

J. whereas this network logic results in the capture of EU funds, notably through participation in projects funded by the EU; whereas entities such as the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), the European Network Against Racism, Al Sharq Forum, Islamic Relief Worldwide and the University of Gaziantep have received, or have been associated with projects receiving, EU funding in sensitive areas such as youth, anti-discrimination, education, culture, research, humanitarian action, intercultural dialogue or university programmes, despite having raised serious questions regarding their ideological, institutional or financial links with networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or political Islam;

K. whereas the search for institutional respectability constitutes a central lever for these networks; whereas an invitation to a European institution, participation in a consultation, a mention in a report, a partnership with an agency or access to an EU programme may constitute a form of political label;

L. whereas some Islamist networks are able, in their institutional relations, to adopt the vocabulary of fundamental rights, inclusion, diversity, intercultural dialogue, anti-racism and the fight against discrimination, while promoting in other spaces logics of separation, community pressure or contestation of democratic principles;

M. whereas the Commission issued a communication on a European Democracy Shield which is intended to prevent and protect the EU against interference; whereas extremist groups are increasingly using online platforms and social media to reach and influence young people, encouraging them to engage with or join such organisations; whereas this phenomenon may be further reinforced through the spread of extremist narratives and recruitment efforts in educational environments;

N. whereas diversity, equity, inclusion and anti-discrimination frameworks may be diverted as vectors of institutional legitimisation, by integrating a politicised religious identity into legitimate causes for the protection of minorities; whereas the necessary fight against discrimination targeting people of Muslim faith must not become a Trojan horse enabling the political recognition of organised Islamist actors;

O. whereas no EU funding has been allocated directly to FEMYSO since 2019 but it, as well as several national associations with demonstrated ideological continuity with the Muslim Brotherhood, were reportedly able to apply for and receive EU funding through calls for projects conducted by consortia of civil society organisations, which FEMYSO

used to organise events across the EU as recently as June 2026; whereas the continued provision of EU funding to FEMYSO, despite its documented links to the Muslim Brotherhood and its participation in events hosted by European institutions, illustrates the particular urgency of addressing Islamist entryism; whereas this example highlights the need for full transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funding and for vigilance against the institutional legitimisation of structures linked to the Muslim Brotherhood;

P. whereas incidents around FEMYSO have recurred during Parliament's European Youth Events (EYEs); whereas the recurring controversies surrounding FEMYSO's participation highlight the institutional and reputational risks arising from its presence; whereas Parliament's Bureau and its various working groups have held several exchanges of views over the past years on the organisation of the EYE, including on the establishment of a code of conduct and the selection criteria of civil society co-organisers; whereas the case of FEMYSO has been discussed on several occasions in that context; whereas FEMYSO was still able to hold its annual European Day of Action Against Islamophobia event on Parliament's premises on 21 September 2026 as a Member outreach event hosted by Members of The Left/GUE;

Q. whereas several Member States and partner countries have recently identified, documented, banned or denounced branches, structures or entities affiliated with, linked to or inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, due to strategies of influence, structuring or reconstitution, as well as hate speech, justification of political violence, ideological or material support for terrorist organisations, destabilisation actions directed against democratic states, threats to national security or violations of the applicable legislation on associations; whereas these elements demonstrate that the phenomenon clearly goes beyond national frameworks;

R. whereas an increasing number of politicians, academics, journalists and intellectuals across Europe are forced to live under permanent police protection due to death threats and intimidation campaigns orchestrated by Islamists;

S. whereas the ongoing investigations into suspected electoral fraud in Borlänge and Järva, Sweden, illustrate the particular vulnerability of diaspora communities to organised attempts at electoral influence; whereas such vulnerabilities may be exploited by malign foreign actors or transnational ideological networks pursuing covert agendas;

T. whereas Common Position 2001/931/CFSP provides for the listing of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts on the EU list of terrorist organisations, including when they facilitate, support, finance or participate in such acts; whereas the assessment of these criteria must take into account not only formal structures, but also ramifications, support networks, relays and associated entities; whereas Hamas, an organisation included on the EU list of terrorist organisations, historically originates from the Muslim Brotherhood movement;

U. whereas the Financial Regulation requires that the implementation of the EU budget respect the values on which the EU is founded; whereas the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) provides for the exclusion from participating in award procedures or in the implementation of EU funding of persons and entities that have engaged in terrorist offences, terrorist financing or incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence against a group of persons or similar activities that are contrary to the values

of the EU;

V. whereas opaque funding chains, financial intermediaries, sub-grants and implementing partners may make it difficult to identify final beneficiaries or recipients, the political objectives pursued and the risks of influence;

W. whereas the fragmentation and lack of interoperability of EU public databases, such as the Financial Transparency System, the EU Transparency Register and the EU Funding and Tenders Portal, restrict the capacity for public scrutiny of how EU policies are shaped and funded and represent a core structural weakness in EU financial monitoring; whereas such fragmentation does not allow for a reliable overview of EU funding, including of final beneficiaries, thereby undermining democratic transparency;

X. whereas the European Court of Auditors has concluded that the Commission and other bodies do not proactively check whether non-governmental organisations in receipt of EU funding comply with EU values, but rely mainly on self-declarations;

Y. whereas Islamist networks may reconstitute themselves under other names, in other Member States or through new structures when an entity is challenged, monitored, deprived of funding, banned or dissolved at national level;

Z. whereas some third countries are leveraging religious actors, associations and segments of their diaspora to interfere with domestic political debates within the EU; whereas Türkiye has provided extensive support to the Muslim Brotherhood, ranging from hosting exiled members of the organisation to the creation of media networks close to the movement; whereas, to this day, Türkiye continues to host the annual conference of the Council of European Muslims, an organisation affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood; whereas the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) maintains structural links with the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs in Germany;

AA. whereas these networks may use the opportunities for movement, residence, academic, associative, religious or cultural mobility within the European area to structure their relays, organise events, disseminate their narratives, strengthen their partnerships and circumvent national surveillance, restriction or prohibition measures; whereas a European response must therefore integrate the instruments falling within the area of freedom, security and justice, notably in relation to visas, residence permits, alerts, external border checks and Schengen cooperation;

AB. whereas the EU and its Member States must ensure that public funds, including EU funds, do not directly or indirectly benefit persons or entities linked to Islamist entryism, radicalisation, antisemitism, terrorism or activities incompatible with the values of the EU;

AC. whereas a European response based on the values of the EU, the rule of law, freedom of religion, transparency, traceability and cooperation between competent authorities is necessary to combat Islamist entryism, prevent the capture of public funding and draw the consequences of ideological, financial, material or organisational links between networks affiliated with or inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and entities or activities falling within the scope of terrorism;

1. Condemns religious and, in particular, Islamist entryism strategies as an unacceptable

form of covert and malicious interference aimed at weakening democratic institutions, the rule of law and the neutrality of public institutions; is concerned by the fact that religious entryism spearheads efforts to roll back women's rights and gender equality, sexual health and reproductive rights, LGBTIQ+ rights, equality between women and men, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, public order, social cohesion and the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

2. Stresses that Europe must remain free, open and faithful to its principles, but that it can no longer fund, consult or legitimise networks that use its language, procedures and funding to weaken its values from within;

3. Recalls that protecting Muslim citizens against discrimination is a democratic obligation, but that recognising organised Islamist networks as representative interlocutors constitutes a political and institutional failure;

4. Recalls the appalling rise of antisemitism across Europe and commits to sparing no effort to fight against it; recognises and denounces efforts to leverage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to spread antisemitic narratives and intensify polarisation within European societies; reiterates that this does not preclude legitimate criticism of actions and policies of the State of Israel, as is the case of any country;

5. Expresses its deep concern at the strategies of influence, structuring, institutional legitimisation and reconstitution implemented by networks linked to or inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in several Member States;

6. Calls for the development of a European methodology to identify signs of Islamist entryism, including confusion between religion and politics, institutional doublespeak, financial opacity, the recurrence of certain partnerships, proximity to already identified networks, the production of activist reports, the reconstitution of structures and the instrumentalisation of anti-discrimination frameworks;

7. Stresses that the fight against discrimination must not be diverted to prevent any criticism of Islam or to confer institutional legitimacy on organised Islamist networks;

8. Believes that the practice of concealing the face in public spaces and premises open to the public poses an unacceptable challenge to public security, identification and effective law enforcement; supports, therefore, all national measures aimed at prohibiting full-face coverings (niqab or burqa) in public spaces and premises open to the public as a necessary step to ensure social cohesion, public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, in particular women;

9. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to support civil society actors, including organisations, intellectuals, association leaders and Muslim representatives, who defend democratic values, freedom of conscience, equality between women and men, the fight against antisemitism and resistance to Islamist pressure;

10. Pays tribute to all victims of Islamist terrorism and expresses its full support for their families, as well as for all whistleblowers, intellectuals, journalists, artists and political figures directly threatened by Islamist movements; commends the courage of all those who have broken with Islamist movements or who publicly denounce Islamist ideology despite threats to their safety;

11. Asks for the European institutions, agencies, advisory bodies and Commission services to strengthen their vigilance before granting institutional recognition, an invitation, a partnership, participation in a consultation or access to events to structures likely to fall within Islamist entryism strategies;

12. Deplores the fact that, despite warnings by several parliamentary groups and intellectuals, FEMYSO was once again able to be invited to Parliament by Members from The Left and the Greens on 21 September 2026; calls for all organisations linked to the Council of European Muslims, such as FEMYSO, to be denied access to the European institutions and for the institutions to ensure that the events and meetings they organise, host or participate in do not contribute to legitimising the entryism strategies of FEMYSO or other structures linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to end the participation of such organisations in those events and meetings; calls for organisations linked to the Council of European Muslims to be removed from the EU Transparency Register;

13. Asks the Commission and the Member States to transmit to the Council, within the framework of existing procedures, all factual, recent and precise elements enabling the assessment of the inclusion of entities, relay structures, leaders or individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on the EU list of terrorist organisations;

14. Invites the Council not to limit this assessment to formally declared structures, but to take into account associated entities, front organisations, reconstituted structures, financial relays, youth networks, ideological platforms, logistical support networks and individuals playing a leadership, coordination or facilitation role;

15. Calls on the Council to include on the EU list of terrorist organisations entities and individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood where the criteria of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP are met and to apply the corresponding restrictive measures;

16. Welcomes initiatives by Member States to draw up national lists of hate preachers and calls for the establishment of such a list at EU level; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen controls relating to the issuance of visas, residence permits and mobility authorisations where individuals, speakers, association representatives, preachers, academics or project partners are linked to individuals on this list;

17. Calls on the Member States, in accordance with EU and national law, to ensure that the active promotion of Islamist ideologies advocating the subjugation of women, antisemitism or hatred against Christians has appropriate legal and administrative consequences, including as regards access to public funding, public benefits and institutional support;

18. Urges the Commission to ensure that no EU funds can reach or benefit, directly or indirectly, entities, partners, contractors, subcontractors, beneficial owners or final beneficiaries or recipients linked to networks included on the EU list of terrorist organisations;

19. Requests that the Commission provide a comprehensive overview of all cases of EU funds awarded to persons and entities suspected of links to the Muslim Brotherhood or political Islam;

20. Asks that this overview specify the amounts received, the programmes and actions concerned, the justifications put forward for the granting of such funding, the roles performed in the projects, and the failures of control, traceability or risk assessment leading to the award of such funds; further requests that the Commission make available to Parliament all grant agreements in question;

21. Asks the Commission to ensure transparency of funding, partnerships, beneficiaries and the application of exclusion criteria, together with full traceability throughout funding chains, including sub-grants, financial intermediaries, implementing partners, beneficial owners, contractors, subcontractors, and final recipients and beneficiaries;

22. Asks the Commission to strengthen due diligence, risk assessment and monitoring obligations applicable to managing authorities, national paying agencies and beneficiaries, and to develop new control and assessment tools adapted to entryism strategies and network structures;

23. Urges the Commission to make full use of the Financial Regulation, notably the EDES, where persons and entities promote Islamist entryism, radicalisation, antisemitism, terrorism, incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence or other activities incompatible with the values of the EU, asks the Commission to present the measures necessary to strengthen the EU's capacity to prevent these entities from accessing EU funding, including follow-up supervision to prevent and remedy attempts to circumvent exclusion by a given organisation which has previously failed to comply with the requirement to respect the EU's fundamental values; calls on the Commission and other EU bodies to proactively assess and strengthen the verification, whether through ex ante checks or the requirement for binding written commitments, of the compliance with EU values of applicants and beneficiaries of EU funding in order to detect potential breaches;

24. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen control over foreign funding, influence operations, associative mobility and transnational partnerships likely to contribute to the institutional legitimisation of Islamist networks in Europe, particularly where they involve actors linked to Qatar or Türkiye;

25. Stresses that freedom of movement within the EU must not be diverted to facilitate the spread of Islamist discourse, the coordination of transnational networks or the circumvention of national prohibition, dissolution, restriction or surveillance measures;

26. Invites the Member States to strengthen cooperation between competent national authorities and to make full use of Schengen cooperation instruments and the relevant European databases, in compliance with EU law, in order to identify networks, relay structures, associated or reconstituted entities, cross-border modes of operation, movements, invitations, events, partnerships or activities likely to contribute to the structuring or reconstitution of Islamist networks in Europe;

27. Calls for strengthened cooperation with Europol, within its mandate, to support strategic analysis, information-sharing and situational awareness concerning transnational Islamist networks and their modes of operation;

28. Invites Eurojust to support, where this falls within its mandate, judicial cooperation between Member States in cases involving transnational networks linked to

radicalisation, the financing of terrorism, incitement to hatred or activities supporting terrorist organisations;

29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, Europol, Eurojust, the governments and parliaments of the Member States as well as to the national authorities responsible for the prevention of radicalisation, internal security and the protection of public order.