Is the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization? 46 years and 4 documented legal avenues

Is the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization? 46 years and 4 documented legal avenues. Who started this, and when: the chronology.

On October 8, the European Parliament called on the Council of the European Union to consider adding entities and individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood to its list of terrorists—that is, the list of terrorist individuals and organizations. It did not include them. This issue has a 46-year history, spanning from Syria in 1980 to Florida in 2026, and has been addressed in four ways: designation by law or decree, judicial decision, partial bans (symbols, association), and reviews or resolutions that do not designate.

https://youtu.be/28SUZxIKGlA

Brussels and Washington apply different legal thresholds; both require facts, not ideology. In the middle is CAIR, designated by Texas and Florida—a designation that took effect on November 5—but never by the federal government. This article documents who did it, when, and based on what text.

On October 8, 2026, in Strasbourg, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution—sponsored by French MEP Céline Imart (EPP), calling on the Council to assess the inclusion of entities linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on the European terrorism list, since the 27 member states do not share a common position and the list requires unanimity (official text P10_TA(2026)0342; vote tally in the European Parliament’s Legislative Observatory summary: “adopted by 381 votes to 167, with 15 abstentions”).

What Happened: What the European Parliament Voted On, According to Its Own Text

Cover page of European Parliament Resolution P10_TA(2026)0342, 10 pages. Source 1.

The resolution is titled “On the Need for an EU Strategy to Counter Islamist Entrism and the Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood Network,” procedure 2026/2868(RSP), and contains 29 recitals and 29 operative paragraphs (official text, PDF version; count matches that in The National, Escudo Digital, JNS, Brussels Signal, and CERIF).

Page 8 of the resolution: operative paragraphs 13, 14, and 15, which call on the Council to evaluate and include; paragraph 15 adds “when the criteria are met.” Screenshot of the official PDF. Source 1.

What it calls for, in its own words. Paragraph 13 “calls on the Commission and the Member States to forward to the Council, within the framework of existing procedures, all recent and accurate factual information necessary to assess the inclusion of entities, successor structures, leaders, or individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on the EU list of terrorist organizations” (this publication’s translation of the official English text, p. 8).

Paragraph 14 calls on the Council not to limit this assessment “to formally declared structures,” but to take into account “affiliated entities, front organizations, reconstituted structures, financial intermediaries, youth networks, ideological platforms, logistical support networks, and individuals playing a leadership, coordination, or facilitation role” (official text, p. 8).

Paragraph 15 “calls on the Council to include entities and individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood on the EU list of terrorist organizations when the criteria set forth in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP are met.” And paragraph 19 “requests that the Commission provide a comprehensive overview of all cases in which EU funds have been granted to individuals and entities suspected of having ties to the Muslim Brotherhood or political Islam” (official text, p. 8).

The text itself sets its own limits. Recital C states that “Islam, as a religion, is not inherently political or hostile,” that “political Islamism should not be presented as synonymous with or representative of Islam as such,” and that “criticism of a political ideology should not be equated with an attack on a religion” (official text, p. 3).

Recital T reiterates the legal basis: Common Position 2001/931/CFSP allows for the listing of those “involved in terrorist acts,” “including when they facilitate, support, finance, or participate in them,” and adds that the assessment must take into account “not only formal structures but also offshoots, support networks, successors, and associated entities.” The same recital notes that Hamas, already on the list, “has its historical origins in the Muslim Brotherhood movement.”

The author is French Member of the European Parliament Céline Imart of the European People’s Party (EPP). She said during the plenary session: “Islam as a faith and political Islam as an ideology must not be conflated”(The National, political.org).

Imart called the approval “historic” (The Jerusalem Post).

The breakdown by group, according to the analysis of the roll call vote by the French think tank CERIF: EPP, 143 in favor and 1 against; ECR, 72 in favor and none against; Renew, 62 in favor, 3 against, 2 abstentions; Socialists and Democrats, 2 in favor and 84 against; Greens, 1 in favor and 40 against; The Left, 1 in favor and 35 against. There was no joint motion negotiated among the groups: the EPP’s motion (B10-0424/2026) as amended, and Renew succeeded in having paragraph 1 condemn “religious entryism, and in particular Islamist entryism” rather than just Islamist entryism (CERIF, two analyses; Brussels Signal; EU Reporter).

The outcome is NOT a designation. A European Parliament resolution is not binding on the Council or the Commission; the Commission has three months to respond, but is not required to submit any proposal (The National, October 9). Including an organization on the list requires unanimity among the 27 member states (Escudo Digital; Commission letter dated June 14, 2026, below). Interior Commissioner Magnus Brunner had already stated that the 27 member states do not share a common position: some classify the organization as terrorist, while others focus on how its network could undermine the democratic system (Escudo Digital).

What has happened since the vote, counting back from today

Florida, as of November 7: three cases, two active. The preliminary injunction against Executive Order 25-244 (Case No. 4:25-cv-516, order of March 4, 2026) remains in effect and is under appeal, and protects only the CAIR Foundation (Order ECF 43, p. 27, cited and reproduced below, along with EO 25-244 and the November 4 order).

An initial lawsuit challenging HB 1471, filed on July 1, 2026, was dismissed on October 1 for lack of standing: Judge Walker ruled that fears of a future appointment, based on statements by the governor, were insufficient, and noted that the plaintiffs could file a new complaint. They filed it that same day (Order ECF 69, Case 4:26-cv-315, pp. 2, 5, and 6, read in its entirety; new complaint, docket entry 1 in Case 4:26-cv-521, October 1, 2026).

On October 1, 2026, District Judge Mark E. Walker dismissed the first lawsuit challenging HB 1471 (ECF 69). Photo: Wikimedia Commons, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Public domain.

Page 6 of Order ECF 69, Case No. 4:26-cv-315: “This case is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” and “Plaintiffs may, of course, file a new lawsuit.” Screenshot from the RECAP PDF. Source 37.

Under HB 1471 (Case No. 4:26-cv-521), Presiding Judge Allen Winsor denied on November 4 nearly all of the relief sought by CAIR-Foundation and CAIR-Florida, granting only a bond of $1,000, and did not rule on whether they are terrorist organizations; the designation took effect on November 5, CAIR-Florida suspended operations, and that same day the two organizations appealed the order to the Eleventh Circuit; the bond was posted on the 6th. Further details can be found in this publication’s companion article on the closure of CAIR-Florida (order ECF 65, pp. 1 and 36; ACLU of Florida, November 5; notice of appeal, ECF 66; notice of bond, ECF 67).

Allen C. Winsor, chief judge of the Northern District of Florida, denied nearly the entire motion for a preliminary injunction on November 4, 2026 (ECF 65). Photo: Wikimedia Commons, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Public domain.

In Congress, nothing has changed: the official status of the three bills on govinfo.gov—checked on October 14 and verified again on November 7 with an identical hash—remains that of 2025 (official legislative status files, see below). There has been no reaction from the Council of the EU: a search on November 7 found no decision or statement from the Council, and the Commission had already set forth its position in writing on June 14, 2026, in response to the French National Assembly (see the section on legal thresholds). This article states that what was not found is simply not found, not that it does not exist.

Between October 8 and 15, what we see is reaction, not action. On October 11, Massad Boulos, senior advisor to the U.S. president on Arab and African affairs, welcomed the European resolution, according to Egypt Today.

Saqr Ghobash, president of the Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates, described it as an “important step” and called for it to be translated into “concrete, coordinated action,” according to the Khaleej Times on October 12.

On October 8, an Egyptian “informed source” told the state-run Al-Qahera News channel, according to a summary by Egypt Today, that the vote amounted to an official acknowledgment of what the source called the group’s terrorist nature—an interpretation that goes beyond the text’s actual wording and that this article records for what it is: Cairo’s position, not that of Parliament (Egypt Today, October 8).

On the European side, MEP Tomas Zdechovsky, the EPP’s spokesperson on budgetary control, said: “We must know who gets EU money, how much, and through which programs, and be able to trace every euro” (The National, October 9).

CAIR did not issue a statement regarding the European resolution in the days following the vote. Its RSS feed, checked on October 14 and 15, listed statements from October 9 through 14 regarding Azerbaijan, the International Criminal Court, ICE, the West Bank, Representative Ilhan Omar, “religious attacks against candidates,” the anniversary of the assassination of Wadea Al Fayoume, Israel, and Iran; none regarding Brussels or the Muslim Brotherhood. On November 7, the feed returned a 403 error and could not be verified. No such press release existed as of October 15, according to CAIR’s RSS feed; CAIR now features this article on its website

Note: Florida officials have unconstitutionally targeted CAIR and CAIR-Florida under a new and unprecedented state law. CAIR and CAIR-Florida have filed a federal lawsuit challenging these actions. We are confident in the strength of our case, and we will continue to fight it.

As a precaution, and to protect our supporters in Florida, CAIR is not accepting donations from, or providing support to, anyone who lives in or is located in Florida, or any business, foundation, or other organization based in Florida. If you are in Florida, please do not make a donation to CAIR at this time by any means. Florida residents should also not sign up for our mailing lists or otherwise engage with CAIR or CAIR-Florida at this time. 

You can follow updates on the case on the website of our legal counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union, here: https://www.aclu.org/cases/cair-foundation-inc-and-cair-florida-inc-v-desantis-et-al

We look forward to your continued support in the future, God willing. 

Who started this, and when: the timeline

The question Brussels has just asked has a history spanning four decades, and governments have responded to it in four ways: designation by law, decree, or administrative list; judicial decision; partial bans, bans on symbols, or bans on association; and parliamentary reviews or resolutions that do not designate. The complete table, with source and status listed by row, appears at the end of this article, before the sources. The essentials, country by country:

Syria: The oldest precedent is Syrian

The oldest precedent comes from Syria. Law No. 49 of 1980, enacted by the government of Hafez al-Assad, imposed the death penalty for membership or affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood; In 2006, Amnesty International documented a death sentence handed down under that law, which was commuted to twelve years in prison (Urgent Action MDE 24/050/2006).

Following the fall of the regime in December 2024, Law 49 has not been repealed. On October 13, 2026, Abdel Nasser Houshan, chairman of the People’s Assembly’s Committee on Constitutional and Legislative Affairs, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the proposal to repeal it “was still at the signature-gathering stage and had not been submitted to the assembly” (it was still in the signature-gathering phase and had not been submitted) (Asharq Al-Awsat, English edition, Source 89; Arabic version, Asharq Al-Awsat, Source 90).

In the People’s Assembly section of the official SANA news agency, as of November 7, 2026, there is no report regarding a vote or Law 49 (SANA, People’s Assembly section, Source 40).

Whether the cessation of emergency laws applied to her is also unclear. On January 29, 2025, the statement from the Military Operations Command stated, in point 2, “the cessation of all exceptional laws” without mentioning Law 49 (SANA, Jan. 29–30, 2025, Source 39). Asharq Al-Awsat writes: “It remains unclear whether that covered Law 49—or whether the law still requires a legislative repeal” (Source 89). The answer: COULD NOT BE VERIFIED.

The constitutional declaration of March 13, 2025, also makes no mention of Law 49. Article 48 states that the State paves the way for transitional justice through, among other measures, “the repeal of all emergency laws that have harmed the Syrian people and violate human rights” (the repeal of all exceptional laws that have harmed the Syrian people and contradict human rights).

Article 51 states, “Existing laws shall remain in force unless they are amended or repealed.” (laws currently in force remain in effect unless they are amended or repealed) (text reproduced by Al Jazeera, Source 91, and by Majalla, Source 92). This piece does not claim that Article 51 upholds Law 49; it states that, in the absence of a specific provision designating it, the text does not repeal it.

The Brotherhood, for its part, stated on September 27, 2026, in a communiqué from its Shura Council, that it will continue to be “a national group independent in its decision-making” (attributed statement; as reported by The Syrian Observer, Sept. 28, 2026, Source 93).

Russia is the first country documented in this article as having a judicial list of terrorist organizations

Russia is the first country documented in this article to have a judicial list of terrorist organizations. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in a ruling dated February 14, 2003 (No. ГКПИ 03-116), designated fifteen organizations as terrorist groups and banned their activities; the official list published by the Federal Security Service (FSB) lists “Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ijwan al-Muslimun)” as entry 7, with the note “effective as of March 4, 2003.”

(FSB’s single federal list, as read; Dawn coverage from February 15, 2003). That designation remains in effect.

In 2006, Kazakhstan included it on a list of twelve banned organizations approved by its Supreme Court

Kazakhstan included it in 2006 on a list of twelve banned organizations approved by its Supreme Court (RFE/RL, October 12, 2006). The fact that Tajikistan has done the same is a piece of information circulating in compilations, but this article was unable to verify it through its own sources. If there was a state prior to Russia that maintained such a list, this article was also unable to verify that.

Egypt

The pivotal event underlying the current debate took place in Egypt on December 25, 2013. Less than two days after the attack on the police headquarters in Mansoura, the interim Egyptian cabinet— the government that emerged following the ouster of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 and whose strongman was then-Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization (Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera, TIMEP, Daily News Egypt; the official text from the Egyptian cabinet could not be located on sis.gov.eg or cabinet.gov.eg; a search on Al-Ahram Gate returned a 403 error on November 7).

Deputy Prime Minister Hossam Eissa announced this at a press conference: “Egypt’s cabinet has decided to declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization subject to Article 86 of the penal code, “ and he added that the penalties would apply “to anyone who participates in the group’s activities, promotes it verbally or in writing, and to anyone who finances it,” as well as “to anyone who joins the group or remains a member after the declaration” (Al-Monitor; four sources that match in date, author, and Article 86).

The Brotherhood, through its interim spokesperson Wafaa Al-Banna, called it a “media stunt” and said the government lacked evidence (Daily News Egypt). Ansar Bait al-Maqdis claimed responsibility for the Mansoura attack, not the Brotherhood, which condemned it (Al Jazeera, December 25, 2013, and TIMEP; discrepancy in death toll: 14 according to Al Jazeera, 17 according to Al-Monitor; the discrepancy is noted).

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed suit in 2014, in the midst of a diplomatic rift with Qatar

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed suit in 2014, in the midst of a diplomatic rift with Qatar. On March 7, 2014, the Saudi Ministry of the Interior announced a list that includes “Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Daesh, the Al-Nusra Front, Hezbollah in the Kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Houthi group” (statement reproduced by the Wilson Center; announcement date from Global Voices; the original from the Saudi Press Agency could not be located).

Its effective date clause states: “These recommendations have been endorsed by Royal Order 16820 dated 5 Jumadi al-Awwal 1435 H and will be enforced, effective Sunday, 8 Jumadi al-Awwal 1435 H (March 9, 2014).” In other words, the announcement was made on March 7, and the recommendations took effect on March 9; this is why some sources date the appointment to March 9 (Wilson Center). Two days earlier, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates had recalled their ambassadors from Doha (Wilson Center).

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)

On November 15, 2014, the Cabinet of the United Arab Emirates approved, pursuant to Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on terrorist offenses, a list of 83 organizations, beginning with the Emirati Muslim Brotherhood and including, among dozens of entities from the Middle East and Europe, the “Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)” (list reproduced by The National, November 16, 2014).

This is the precedent that Florida would cite twelve years later in its own case against CAIR (Modern Diplomacy, October 5, 2026).

Bahrain did not designate it, and its foreign minister made two statements in two days. On March 20, 2014, at a press conference in Islamabad, Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa said that his government did not label the political wing of the local branch, Al-Menbar, because it had respected the law, and that “we do not view it as a global movement,” distinguishing the international organization from its local branches (Carnegie Endowment, Sada, May 20, 2014).

Following media reports that portrayed him as contradicting Riyadh, the foreign minister wrote on his official account: “I never said or mentioned that the Muslim Brotherhood was not a terrorist group, “ and “The Muslim Brotherhood is a global movement with the same approach”: Each state, he said, treats its members according to their actions toward the state (Gulf News, March 22, 2014).

In July 2017, at the height of the crisis with Qatar, the foreign minister himself said: “We consider the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group, and anyone who shows sympathy for them will be tried on this basis” (Al Jazeera, July 2017). This article was unable to locate any formal Bahraini designation—whether a decree, law, or list—but there are ministerial statements.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom reviewed the matter and decided against it. In April 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron commissioned an internal review led by Sir John Jenkins and Charles Farr; its main findings were published on December 17, 2015 (HC 679).

Cameron’s written statement to Parliament concludes that “membership, affiliation, or influence of the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered a potential indicator of extremism” and that “parts of the Muslim Brotherhood have a highly ambiguous relationship with violent extremism” (gov.uk, the Prime Minister’s statement and PDF of the findings, reviewed).

But the British government did NOT ban it: it pledged to “keep under review whether the views and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood meet the legal criteria for proscription” (gov.uk). This is a threshold of attributable violence, similar in substance—though not in form—to those later cited by Washington and Brussels.

Austria

Austria banned the symbols, not the organization. The Austrian Symbols Act (Symbole-Gesetz) added “the Muslim Brotherhood” to Section 3 through Amendment BGBl. I No. 2/2019, whose effective date clause states that “§ 1 and § 2 … as set forth in the federal law BGBl. I No. 2/2019 shall enter into force on March 1, 2019”; the 2021 amendment (BGBl. I No. 162/2021) expanded the list to include other groups (consolidated text available at gesetzefinden.at, an unofficial host; APA report on the ÖVP-FPÖ vote).

Two official documents give different dates, and the discrepancy can be explained: the European resolution refers to the law “as amended in 2018” because the Nationalrat voted on the amendment in December 2018 (the archived APA report is from that month), while the French resolution refers to “measures taken by Austria since 2021” due to the 2021 extension. The legal text is clear: the effective date for the Brotherhood was March 1, 2019 (consolidated text; APA).

Libya, 2019

Libya, 2019. The Tobruk-based House of Representatives voted on May 13, 2019, to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, arguing that it was assisting armed groups in Tripoli (Libya Security Monitor and Tunisie Numérique, May 13 and 14, 2019; the official text of the vote could not be located).

Jordan, April 23, 2025

Jordan, April 23, 2025. Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya announced “the immediate enforcement of legal provisions against the so-called dissolved Muslim Brotherhood group, describing it as an illegal association,” a ban on all activities carried out under its name, the closure of its offices, and the confiscation of its assets, one week after the government announced that it had foiled a plot involving explosives attributed to a close associate of the group’s leadership (Jordan News, Al-Monitor).

The French resolution of January 2026 states that Jordan thus enforced “a 2020 court ruling that had declared the movement illegal” (text from the National Assembly). That same Jordanian branch would be designated by the U.S. Treasury nine months later.

France, May 2025 and January 2026

France, May 2025 and January 2026. The report “Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France, ” published on the French Ministry of the Interior’s website, was “presented at the National Defense and Security Council meeting on May 21, 2025,” according to the National Assembly; the 76-page report itself does not state who commissioned it or who signed it.

The report does not recommend adding the Brotherhood to any terrorist list: it calls for a legal definition of the phenomenon (p. 58 of the PDF) and “the formation of a coalition of like-minded member states on the issue of political Islamism and entryism into European institutions” (p. 60 of the PDF) (full report, 76 pages, OCR-scanned; date and source: Adopted Text 215, p. 3).

Its conclusion states: “No recent document demonstrates the intention of Muslims in France to establish an Islamic state in France or to enforce Sharia law there,” and adds that the evidence gathered “does, however, confirm the existence of a threat to national cohesion” (report, p. 66 of the PDF).

The report is listed among the “references” in the resolution by which the National Assembly adopted, on January 22, 2026, Adopted Text No. 215, a “European resolution,” paragraph 5 of which “Calls on the Commission to submit to the Council a proposal to include the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its leaders on the European list of terrorist organizations” (calls on the Commission to submit to the Council a proposal to include the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its leaders on that list; translation by this publication) (official text of the National Assembly, as read, p. 4, paragraph 5).

Page 4 of Adopted Text No. 215: paragraph 5, which calls on the Commission to propose inclusion on the European list, and the reference to the 2020 Jordanian court decision. Rendering of the official PDF. Source 5.

That text lists in its recitals the bans “in several countries, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.” It was adopted by a vote of 157 in favor, 101 against, and 1 abstention (official text; tally according to CERIF, vote analysis). The European resolution from October expressly cites both French documents in its recitals (P10_TA(2026)0342). The European Commission replied to the Assembly on June 14, 2026, with the signatures of Kaja Kallas and Maroš Šefčovič: It took note of the appeal and reiterated the prerequisite legal condition and the requirement for unanimity (see below) (letter C(2026) 4123 final, 3 pages, read aloud).

Page 1 of European Commission Letter C(2026) 4123 final, June 14, 2026, addressed to Yaël Braun-Pivet, President of the National Assembly: “The legal prerequisite is the existence of a decision by a competent national authority.” Rendering of the PDF hosted by the National Assembly. Source 4.

The Netherlands, March 17, 2026

The Netherlands, March 17, 2026. The European resolution itself, in its recitals, notes “the motion adopted by the Dutch Tweede Kamer on March 17, 2026, calling for a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and organizations linked to it in the Netherlands” (the motion and its date are recorded in the official text of the European Parliament, p. 3). The vote tally published by EU Reporter—76 to 150—could not be verified by this article using the Dutch parliament’s official record.

Page 3 of the resolution: the reference to the motion of the Tweede Kamer dated March 17, 2026, and recital C. Render from the official PDF. Source 1.

Governor Greg Abbott – Texas

Texas, November 18, 2025. Governor Greg Abbott issued a proclamation designating the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR as foreign terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations, prohibiting them from acquiring real estate in the state. His official statement reads: “The Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR have long made their goals clear: to forcibly impose Sharia law and establish Islam’s ‘mastership of the world’” (statement from the Texas governor’s office, downloaded and reviewed for this case).

Screenshot of Governor Greg Abbott’s statement from November 18, 2025, archived by this publication. Source 18.

What followed in Texas unfolded on two fronts. CAIR Texas, CAIR DFW, and CAIR Austin filed a lawsuit against Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton in the Western District of Texas (Case No. 1:25-cv-01878) and sought a preliminary injunction on January 22, 2026: They argue that Proclamation 41-4241 exceeds the governor’s authority and encroaches on federal jurisdiction, and that it imposes punitive consequences “without any notice or opportunity to be heard” (Motion ECF 30, pp. 1–2).

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

Ken Paxton, Texas’s attorney general, filed the petition against the Muslim Brotherhood and four CAIR entities on February 5, 2026. Photo: official portrait, texasattorneygeneral.gov/about-office, downloaded on November 7, 2026.

The latest documented development in that lawsuit: As of March 4, 2026, it was still in the discovery phase, and the docket consulted on October 16 showed no ruling on the preliminary injunction (order dated March 4, 2026, in Florida, ECF 43, p. 2, note 2; docket, last visible entry dated June 29, 2026; subsequent status could not be verified).

The state opened the second front. On February 5, 2026, Paxton filed a petition in a Collin County District Court against five defendants: the Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR-Foundation, CAIR-Texas, CAIR-Texas Dallas Fort Worth, and CAIR-Austin. It seeks to have them designated as a foreign terrorist organization (Texas Penal Code, § 71.01(e)) and a transnational criminal organization (Property Code, § 5.254(a)(2)(A)), and that they be prohibited from “engaging in any activities within the State of Texas” (petition filed by the State of Texas, read in full, 32 pages; case number blank).

Page 31 of the State of Texas’s petition: the final request to the court. Screenshot of the official PDF; the yellow highlighting is by this publication. Source 19.

The petition states that Ghassan Elashi, whom it identifies as a founding board member of CAIR-Texas, is serving a 65-year prison sentence in connection with the Holy Land Foundation, and that “federal prosecutors named CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator.” The press release mentioned the chapters in “Austin, Houston, and DFW”; in the petition, Houston appears only as the address of the registered agent. CAIR responded: “We look forward to doing so again” (petition, pp. 2 and 4; press release; The Texas Tribune).

This article documents the first time CAIR has been designated by a U.S. government; whether it was the first such designation in the West, this article was unable to verify.

Donald J. Trump, President of the United States.

Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, signed Executive Order 14362 on November 24, 2025; the order does not designate anyone. Photo: official presidential portrait, whitehouse.gov/administration/donald-j-trump, downloaded on November 7, 2026.

Washington, November 24, 2025, through March 16, 2026. Six days after the Texas incident, President Trump signed Executive Order 14362 (published on November 28, 90 Fed. Reg. 55033), which does not designate anyone: it directs the State Department and the Treasury to assess within 30 days whether specific sectors meet the criteria, and to take action within an additional 45 days (govinfo.gov).

On January 13, 2026, the first three were designated: Lebanon (FTO and SDGT, State Department), Egypt, and Jordan (SDGT, Treasury, for providing material support to Hamas) (State Department fact sheet; Federal Register, doc. 2026-00573).

The fourth is Sudan, and this is not a future plan: on March 9, 2026, the State Department announced the designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, “composed of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and its armed wing, the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade”; the two Federal Register notices, signed by Marco Rubio on March 8 and published on the 16th, designate it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“the designation goes into effect upon publication”) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist: both effective March 16 (State Department website; doc. 2026-05072 (FTO) and doc. 2026-05084 (SDGT), reviewed).

Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

On March 8, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed the Federal Register notices designating the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. Photo: official portrait, state.gov/biographies/marco-rubio, downloaded on Nov. 7, 2026.

Federal Register Notice 2026-05072, Public Notice 12967: designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization; “the designation goes into effect upon publication,” signed by Marco Rubio on March 8, 2026. Screenshot of the PDF available for public inspection. Source 13.

Federal Register Notice 2026-05084, Public Notice 12968: Designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, signed on March 8, 2026, published on the 16th. Rendering of the PDF for public inspection. Source 14.

Governor Ron DeSantis – Florida

Florida, December 8, 2025, through November 5, 2026. Executive Order 25-244 by Governor Ron DeSantis, blocked by a federal judge only with respect to the CAIR Foundation; House Bill 1471, effective July 1, 2026; designation of CAIR-Foundation and CAIR-Florida by the governor and the Cabinet on September 29, published on October 6, and effective as of November 5; currently under litigation, with the preliminary injunction denied almost in its entirety on November 4 (EO 25-244; Order ECF 65, pp. 1, 3, 19, and 20; the law takes effect on July 1 according to Yahoo, November 6, 2026; the order does not include that date).

Ron DeSantis, governor of Florida, signed Executive Order 25-244 on December 8, 2025. Photo: official portrait, flgov.com/eog/leadership/people/ron-desantis, downloaded on November 7, 2026.

Page 1 of Executive Order 25-244 issued by Governor Ron DeSantis on December 8, 2025, designating CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood “for the purposes of this order.” Screenshot of the official PDF from flgov.com, source verified via digital fingerprint. Source 35.

Florida is the only state that this article documents as having done so by law, not just by executive order or proclamation; if another state has an equivalent law, this article was unable to verify it.

Strasbourg, October 8, 2026. As already mentioned: a non-binding resolution calling for an assessment.

Read in one go, the arc follows a sequence that can be listed without further qualification, and that combines events of different natures. It was initiated—by law, court order, or decree—in Syria ( 1980), Russia (2003), Egypt (2013), Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (2014). It was reviewed but not banned by the United Kingdom (2015) and, on two occasions and without a formal decision, by the U.S. government (2017 and 2019). Since 2025, it has been taken up again, in stages, by Jordan, Texas, Florida, the U.S. federal government (branch by branch), and three European parliaments, which have requested it from the body that actually has the authority to decide.

This article does not judge whether or not the movement deserves the designation.

Different legal thresholds, as seen from Brussels and Washington

In the European Union, this requirement dates back to 2001. Article 1.4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP states that the list “shall be drawn up on the basis of precise information or elements in the case file indicating that a competent authority has taken a decision regarding the persons, groups, and entities concerned,” whether that involves the initiation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, an attempt to commit such an act, participation in it, or facilitation of it “on the basis of serious and credible evidence or indications,” or a conviction (EUR-Lex, official text in English, translation by this publication).

The same article defines “competent authority” as “a judicial authority or, where judicial authorities do not have jurisdiction in the matter, an equivalent competent authority” (EUR-Lex, official text in English, translation by this publication). Ideological affinity, on its own, is not mentioned in that article.

Working copy of this version of Article 1, paragraph 4, of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, based on the archived text from EUR-Lex (not a rendering of the original page): “a decision has been taken by a competent authority”; “a judicial authority, or … an equivalent competent authority.” Source 3.

The European Commission stated this in its own words on June 14, 2026, in response to the French National Assembly: “The prerequisite is the existence of a decision by a competent national authority establishing the involvement of the person or entity in question in an ‘act of terrorism,’” and, once that requirement is met, a proposal for listing “can only be adopted if there is unanimous agreement among the Member States in the Council” (letter C(2026) 4123 final, pp. 1 and 2, translation by this publication).

Page 2 of Letter C(2026) 4123 final: “A proposal for inscription … may be adopted only if there is unanimous agreement among the member states within the Council.” Rendered from the PDF hosted by the National Assembly. Source 4.

The letter is signed by High Representative Kaja Kallas and Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič. It demands that the national authority’s decision establish involvement in an “act of terrorism” within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 of February 26, 2026 (C(2026) 4123 final, pp. 1 and 2).

That Decision, which has been read in its entirety for the purposes of this article, consolidates the EU’s counterterrorism sanctions into a single text and repeals Articles 2, 3, and 3a of the 2001 Common Position, the substance of which it purports to reproduce. Article 1(1) defines “terrorist act”; Article 2(2) and (3) repeat the condition from 2001: the list is drawn up based on a decision by a “competent authority,” which is “a judicial authority” or its equivalent; and Article 4(1) requires the Council to decide “by unanimity” (Decision (CFSP) 2026/455, recital 13 and Articles 1, 2, 4, and 11).

Article 4(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2026/455, “by unanimity.” Screenshot of the official text from EUR-Lex; the yellow highlighting is by this publication. Source 3.

The Decision adds a new provision: Article 2, paragraph 4, allows for the freezing of funds belonging to persons or entities “associated with” those already included in Annex I—for example, for “participating in the financing of terrorist acts”—on a separate list, Annex II, which was published empty. Annex I lists 23 groups and entities, including “Hamas, including Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem”; no branch of the Muslim Brotherhood appears on it. Any inclusion on that new list also requires unanimity (Decision (CFSP) 2026/455, Art. 2.4 and 4.1, Annexes I and II).

When the Assembly voted in January, Kallas had already responded that, under the current regulations, an organization is only included on the list if it is involved in the “attempt, participation, or facilitation” of an attack (Digital Shield). The October resolution repeats that condition in its Recital T.

The U.S. threshold is different in nature. The federal law for designating a Foreign Terrorist Organization (8 U.S.C. § 1189) does not require a prior judicial decision: it requires the Secretary of State to find that it is a foreign organization, that it engages in terrorist activity or retains the capacity and intent to do so, and that such activity threatens U.S. citizens or national security. These are two different thresholds, not the same hurdle: Brussels requires a decision by a competent authority plus unanimity among 27 governments; Washington requires facts attributable to an identifiable organization. What they share is that neither is satisfied with ideology alone (Federal Register 2026-05072, citing section 219 of the INA; EUR-Lex).

Jeff Breinholt, a former official in the Department of Justice’s National Security Division who coordinated the crackdown on terrorist financing between 2001 and 2008, wrote in December 2025, regarding the attempt to designate Antifa, that “terrorist designation authorities are designed to operate against identifiable foreign organizations, not fluid domestic ones, ” and that when those tools “are stretched to cover entities that do not fit that model, the legal coherence and prosecutorial reliability of the system begin to fray”; he then applies that framework to the Brotherhood (War on the Rocks, December 23, 2025).

Regarding the Brotherhood, Breinholt writes that it is a network of national branches that “never became a single unified body, ” and that “it is far from clear” whether a “Global Muslim Brotherhood” with centralized leadership exists (War on the Rocks). The Council on Foreign Relations describes it as “a loose network” of parties and groups that differ in doctrine and strategy from one country to another (CFR).

The 2015 British review, on its own, arrived at the same structural description and a similar practical conclusion: an indicator of extremism, yes; a threshold for proscription, no (gov.uk). The path Washington chose in 2026—to designate country by country, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan, each based on its own specific circumstances—is the one permitted by its threshold; and it is, in essence, what the European resolution, in paragraphs 13 through 15, proposes to the Council under its own framework; paragraph 15 specifies this: entities and individuals “when the criteria are met,” not the movement as a whole (official texts from both sides).

What the United States Has Achieved, and What It Has Not Yet Achieved

The GLOBAL Muslim Brotherhood, as a movement, remains unlisted on the federal list (as of this date). However, since January 2026, Washington has separately designated four national branches. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on January 13, in his official statement: “These designations reflect the initial steps of an ongoing, sustained effort to thwart the Muslim Brotherhood chapters’ violence and destabilization wherever it occurs. The United States will use all available tools to deprive these Muslim Brotherhood chapters of the resources to engage in or support terrorism.” (State Department, Secretary’s statement)

Working copy of this version of Secretary Rubio’s statement dated January 13, 2026, based on the archived page from state.gov (not a rendering of the original page). Source 8.

The two categories are not the same thing. The designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is based on Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is signed by the Secretary of State; the designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) is based on Executive Order 13224 and can be made by the State Department or the Treasury Department. Branch by branch, with their respective documents:

The State Department fact sheet dated January 13 explains the background of the Lebanese branch: After October 7, 2023, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah “reactivated its al-Fajr Forces and launched rockets, in coordination with Hezbollah and Hamas, from Lebanon into northern Israel,” and in July 2025, the Lebanese army dismantled a training camp housing militants from that group and from Hamas (State Department, designations fact sheet).

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said, “The Muslim Brotherhood has a longstanding record of perpetrating acts of terror, and we are working aggressively to cut them off from the financial system” (Department of the Treasury).

Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury, spoke in the Treasury Department’s January 13, 2026, press release regarding the designations of the Egyptian and Jordanian branches. Photo: official portrait, home.treasury.gov/about/general-information/officials/scott-bessent, downloaded on Nov. 7, 2026.

The Egyptian branch responded in a statement on social media that the designation “is completely divorced from reality and baseless,” that “it is the result of foreign pressure on the United States, particularly from the United Arab Emirates and Israel,” and promised to “pursue legal avenues to challenge the decision,” maintaining that it opposes violence and has never threatened the United States (reporting by AFP via Grupo Animal; the Lebanese branch’s reaction could not be verified through our own sources and is not asserted).

CAIR, which has been designated separately at the state level in Texas and Florida and was listed by the United Arab Emirates in 2014, has not been designated at the federal level—neither as an organization nor with regard to its leaders.

Attempts to go further—and why they haven’t become law

Congress has three active bills, none of which have become law, and none of which have made any progress in 2026. According to the official status of each bill on govinfo.gov, accessed on October 14 and rechecked on November 7, 2026, with no changes: S.2293 (“Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2025”) by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) has as its most recent action “Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations,” July 15, 2025 (official legislative status record; identical record in both queries).

H.R. 4397, a bipartisan bill introduced by Florida Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart (R-FL-26) and Jared Moskowitz (D-FL-23), was “Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 35–14” by the Foreign Affairs Committee on December 3, 2025, with no further action taken. H.R. 3883, introduced by Representative Nancy Mace (R-SC), has been pending in the Judiciary Committee since June 10, 2025 (official legislative status records, read on October 14 and reconfirmed on November 7).

When reintroducing the motion, Moskowitz said: “Countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Austria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and France have already taken important steps to investigate and crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates. “ It is the same list that this article has just gone through, with one factual nuance: of those seven, the ones that formally designated the movement as a terrorist organization are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; Jordan banned it as an illegal association; Austria banned its symbols; France published a report and a parliamentary resolution; and Bahrain issued ministerial statements (press release from Díaz-Balart’s office, July 15, 2025; see the timeline in this article).

On August 5, 2026, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Federal Courts, Oversight, Agency Action, and Federal Rights held a hearing titled “Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America, ” chaired by Cruz, according to the Jewish Insider. The five Democrats on the subcommittee—Whitehouse, Blumenthal, Hirono, Padilla, and Welch—boycotted the hearing, calling it an attempt to stigmatize Muslims (official website of the Senate Judiciary Committee; Jewish Insider).

This isn’t the first time. In 2019, during Trump’s first term, the White House worked to designate the entire movement following a visit by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; John Bolton and Mike Pompeo supported the move, but the Department of Defense and several national security officials and diplomats opposed it, and it did not materialize (CNN, April 30, 2019). In 2017, the administration explored the option and again ran into internal objections from officials, diplomats, and government lawyers, who argued that the group did not meet the legal criteria (CNN, 2019; Al Jazeera, 2017).

On February 23, 2017, a coalition of 81 civil society, human rights, and religious organizations—including the ACLU, CAIR, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Brennan Center for Justice, issued a joint statement: the designation “could lead to the stigmatization and singling out of American Muslim civil society” and “to a witch hunt against Muslim civil society in the United States” (full text of the “Statement of 81 Civil, Human Rights, and Faith-Based Groups, ” copy from the Brennan Center, 3 pages, read; date and signatories, HuffPost, February 24, 2017; a later version hosted by Media Alliance is titled “Statement of 82”; the discrepancy is noted).

Three weeks earlier, CAIR had described the bill as a potential “witch hunt”(Al Jazeera, February 1, 2017). Scholar Marc Lynch (GWU) warned in 2016 that stigmatizing the group could push frustrated members toward more radical factions (opinion piece published via Al Jazeera). Each of these objections is cited here for its own argument; none, as cited, denies that a link between political Islamism and violence might exist, and this article neither affirms nor rules it out.

CAIR on That Issue: What’s on the Record in Court—and What Isn’t

CAIR appears three times in the timeline of this article—UAE 2014, Texas 2025, Florida 2025–2026—and none of those three instances involves a decision by the U.S. federal government, which has never accused, convicted, or designated CAIR. The origin of the debate is none of those designations: it is the federal case involving the Holy Land Foundation, and there are two sides to it, both with solid sources. Everything that follows was verified by this publication against the very same primary sources cited here.

On the side of scrutiny. Following a first trial that ended in a hung jury in 2007, the 2008 retrial resulted in the conviction of the Holy Land Foundation and five of its leaders on all conspiracy charges, including providing material support to Hamas (Department of Justice, November 24, 2008)

. Prosecutors had included CAIR on a list of 246 “unindicted co-conspirators” (Fifth Circuit, 2010, p. 3).

Page 3 of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, No. 09-10875: the list of “246 individuals and entities,” the “unfortunate oversight” acknowledged by the Government, and footnote 1, “CAIR is not a party to this appeal.” Screenshot of the official PDF. Source 32.

Lara Burns, a retired FBI special agent who led the investigation into that case between 2001 and 2008,

He submitted written testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Federal Courts on August 5, 2026: “As of 1994, the four U.S.-based Hamas front organizations were the HLF, IAP, UASR, and CAIR” (written testimony, 42 pages, p. 19).

Page 19 (page 20 of the PDF) of Lara Burns’ written testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Federal Courts, August 5, 2026: “As of 1994, the four U.S.-based Hamas front organizations were the HLF, IAP, UASR, and CAIR.” This is a statement by a witness, not a finding by this publication. Screenshot from the official PDF. Source 27.

Ghassan Elashi, chairman of the board of the Holy Land Foundation according to the Department of Justice, was, according to Lorenzo Vidino’s study for the George Washington University Program on Extremism, “a founding board member of the Texas chapter of CAIR” (Vidino, 2023, p. 13; Burns, p. 22).

The Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction on December 7, 2011, in United States v. El-Mezain ( No. 09-10560): “the district court imposed sentences ranging from 65 years in prison for Baker and Elashi, to 20 years for Abdulqader, and 15 years for Odeh and El-Mezain, ” and “we AFFIRM the judgments of conviction and sentences for the individual defendants” (Fifth Circuit opinion, pp. 15 and 170).

That is not to say that the national organization CAIR or its national founders have been charged or convicted: this article distinguishes between the conduct of a founder and that of a local chapter of the national organization.

Following the incident, the FBI suspended its formal contacts with CAIR. The April 28, 2009, letter from Richard C. Powers, Assistant Director of the FBI, to Senator Jon Kyl states: “The FBI suspended all formal contacts between CAIR and the FBI, ” and in the following sentence: “The FBI’s decision to suspend formal contacts was not intended to reflect a wholesale judgment of the organization and its entire membership” (full letter hosted by a media outlet; original held by the FBI; copy on file with this media outlet).

Page 1 of the FBI’s letter to Senator Kyl dated April 28, 2009, signed by Richard C. Powers, Assistant Director; hosted by a media outlet, with the FBI as the original custodian. Rendering of the archived PDF. Source 31.

In September 2013 (Report I-2013-007R, 41 pages), the Inspector General of the Department of Justice reviewed five incidents from 2010 to 2012 in which FBI offices interacted with CAIR despite the restriction, and found that in three of the five cases, field personnel did not follow the applicable policy (Inspector General’s report, pp. 1 and 2, full text).

And then there is the 1991 memo, Government Exhibit 003-0085 in the trial (Case 3:04-CR-240-G), which referred to a “jihadist process of civilization” aimed at “destroying Western civilization from within.” CAIR did not exist when it was written—it was founded in 1994—and is not mentioned in it (memo, original held by the court; reproduction in Burns, pp. 6–7; date of founding in the Inspector General’s report, note 1).

What links CAIR to that network, according to the 2009 FBI letter, is evidence presented in the same proceeding: the letter states that at the trial , “evidence was introduced that demonstrated a relationship among CAIR, individual CAIR founders,” and the Palestine Committee. And according to Vidino, “an internal memorandum from the Palestine Committee dated July 1994 recognized CAIR, along with IAP, UASR, and HLF, as part of the Committee” (Powers letter, verbatim comparison with the same letter; Vidino, p. 14). These are statements attributed to the FBI and an academic.

On the other side, with equally reliable sources. It was the district judge who ruled that publishing that list of 246 names violated the Fifth Amendment rights of the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), the entity that filed the complaint; the government did not appeal that point and admitted that failing to submit it under seal was an “unfortunate oversight” (Fifth Circuit, 2010, p. 3).

The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Holy Land Foundation (NAIT’s appeal, No. 09-10875, October 20, 2010), ordered the order to be unsealed, denied the motion to redact NAIT’s name, and stated that it could neither affirm nor reverse the finding of a due process violation “because the Government has not appealed it. “The district court’s ruling on that issue is the final determination thereof.” Footnote 1 clarifies: “CAIR is not a party to this appeal” (full opinion, 13 pages, pp. 3 and 13).

The same opinion states, regarding NAIT’s inclusion on the list, that it was “simply an untested allegation by the Government” (p. 10) and that the district court’s findings “do not amount to a ruling that NAIT took part in a criminal conspiracy to support Hamas” (p. 12). This is the strongest legal argument from the opposing side, and it refers to NAIT, not CAIR, which was not a party to the appeal (Fifth Circuit, 2010, pp. 10 and 12).

Page 10 of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, No. 09-10875: “simply an untested allegation by the Government.” Screenshot of the official PDF. Source 32.

Page 12 of the same opinion: “do not amount to a ruling that NAIT took part in a criminal conspiracy to support Hamas.” Screenshot from the official PDF. Source 32.

Jason Blazakis, a former counterterrorism official at the State Department and professor at the Middlebury Institute, included a rebuttal in the materials presented to the Florida Cabinet on September 29, 2026: Florida’s evidence was insufficient for a terrorism designation, and the federal government has never designated CAIR or any of its chapters under either the FTO or SDGT regimes (according to a report by Modern Diplomacy, October 5, 2026; Blazakis’s original document could not be opened). The Israel Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) concluded that “no legal evidence of a formal or institutional link” between CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas has been presented (INSS).

The most honest approach acknowledges the documented facts and nothing more: no court has established that CAIR is currently part of the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas, and the November 4, 2026, court order in Florida expressly states that this was not the issue at that stage. What is on record from the other side is that three governments—one foreign and two state governments—have placed it on their lists, while the federal government has not done so (Order ECF 65, p. 6: “the issue at this stage is not whether Plaintiffs are, in fact, terrorist organizations”).

Regarding its electoral activities, it is important to clarify who is responsible. Endorsements of candidates are not issued by CAIR or CAIR-Florida, but rather by CAIR Action, a separate political advocacy organization: according to a report by The Dallas Express cited by Yahoo, CAIR Action issued 59 full endorsements, four joint endorsements, and 306 “preferred selections” in Texas prior to the November 3, 2026, election, and stated that CAIR and CAIR Action have separate boards and programs. CAIR Action describes itself as a political advocacy organization separate from CAIR, with its own board and programs (according to the Yahoo report , November 6, 2026; the original review by The Dallas Express was not archived).

Why It Matters in Miami-Dade

Florida is the only state documented in this article that turned this question into LAW, and that law will take effect on November 5, 2026.

The designation of CAIR-Foundation and CAIR-Florida as “domestic terrorist organizations,” approved by the governor and the Cabinet on September 29 and published in the Administrative Register on October 6, took effect 30 days later, November 5, as set forth in Chief Judge Allen Winsor’s order: “The designations take effect on November 5, 2026” (Order ECF 65, pp. 1, 3, 19, and 20; statute 943.03102(2)(f) cited therein).

Page 36 of Order ECF 65 dated November 4, 2026, CAIR-Foundation v. DeSantis, 4:26-cv-521: protected legal services, “The motion is otherwise DENIED,” $1,000 bond, signed “s/ Allen Winsor, Chief United States District Judge.” PDF rendering from RECAP. Source 37.

Page 20 of the Florida Administrative Record, Vol. 52, No. 194, October 6, 2026: the notice of designation of CAIR-Foundation and CAIR-Florida published by the FDLE, for which the 30-day period runs until November 5. Screenshot of the official PDF from flrules.org, source verified via digital fingerprint. Source 38.

What a judge blocked and what he did not, involving three cases that should not be confused. Regarding Executive Order 25-244 of December 2025 (Case No. 4:25-cv-516), Judge Mark E. Walker issued a preliminary injunction on March 4, 2026, which remains in effect and is under appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, with an oral argument scheduled for October 13 (ECF 110, p. 2).

But that order is narrow, and she says so herself: “It only prevents the Defendant from enforcing the EO with respect to Plaintiff CAIR. It is not a blanket injunction. It does not even enjoin the Defendant’s actions with respect to the other Plaintiff in this case, CAIR-FL, or the other organization named in the EO.” (Order ECF 43, p. 27)

Page 27 of Judge Walker’s order dated March 4, 2026, Case No. 4:25-cv-516: the scope of the preliminary injunction, “It is not a universal injunction.” PDF rendering from RECAP. Source 36.

Under HB 1471 (Case No. 4:26-cv-521, the second lawsuit challenging that law; the first, 4:26-cv-315, was dismissed for lack of standing on October 1), the proceedings took a different course: on October 6, Walker denied the temporary restraining order because the designations “do not take effect until November 5, 2026”; on the 7th, he scheduled the preliminary injunction hearing for the 22nd; on the 15th, he recused himself from the case (“Accordingly, I hereby disqualify myself”), calling the arguments for his recusal—raised by the defendants in the previous cases—“nothing but rank judge shopping,” but conceding in order to avoid wasting resources if the Eleventh Circuit were to rule against him (ECF 28; ECF 56).

Page 1 of Judge Walker’s ECF Order 28, October 6, 2026, Case No. 4:26-cv-521: denies the motion for a temporary restraining order because the designations “do not take effect until November 5, 2026.” PDF rendering from RECAP. Source 37.

The docket entry dated October 16 recorded the reassignment to Judge Robert L. Hinkle; the hearing was held on the 28th before Winsor, whose order cites the reassignment (ECF 59) (docket, accessed October 16; ECF 65, p. 2). That order is a docket entry, with no separate PDF in the public record: “ORDER FOR REASSIGNMENT—The clerk must reassign this case to Chief Judge Winsor. Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L. HINKLE on 10/16/2026” (docket for case 4:26-cv-521, entry 59).

The same record explains why the transcript of the October 28 hearing (ECF 64) is not available: the notice of its filing states that it “may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber” and sets the “Release of Transcript Restriction” for February 8, 2027 (docket, entry 64).

Page 2 of Judge Walker’s recusal order, ECF 56, October 15, 2026: “Accordingly, I hereby disqualify myself.” PDF rendering from RECAP. Source 37.

On November 4, Winsor granted the motion “in part”: he prohibited the application of Florida Statute 775.33(3) against the plaintiffs, their employees, or third parties for providing them with legal services, with a bond of $1,000, and added: “The motion is otherwise DENIED.” This is a preliminary ruling, not a decision on the merits; the order itself states that “the issue at this stage is not whether Plaintiffs are, in fact, terrorist organizations,” and describes the scheme as “novel, and perhaps unprecedented,” without that rendering it unconstitutional (ECF 65, pp. 6 and 36).

CAIR-Florida suspended its operations in the state; the ACLU of Florida, which represents it, announced on November 5 that the two organizations would appeal and that the order “does not resolve the case” (ACLU of Florida; Tallahassee Democrat, November 4). The notice of appeal was filed that same day, November 5, and the $1,000 bond was filed on November 6 (ECF 66, p. 1; ECF 67, p. 1).

Page 1 of the notice of appeal, ECF 66, filed on November 5, 2026: CAIR-Foundation and CAIR Florida are appealing the November 4 order to the Eleventh Circuit. Screenshot of the PDF with the court seal, copy published by the ACLU. Source 37.

The timeline in this article puts that dispute into perspective: Florida and Texas took action against CAIR based on a 2014 case from another jurisdiction and without any federal precedent; and what Brussels requested in October—to evaluate organizations “when the criteria are met”—is the question that Florida answered on its own, using its own threshold and under a state statute, before any court had ruled on the merits of the case. The shutdown of CAIR-Florida and the full court order are covered in a separate article in this publication.

What the documents still don’t answer

• Whether the Council of the EU will even initiate the assessment requested by the Parliament: as of November 7, 2026, there is no record of a decision or statement from the Council.
• What “decision by a competent authority” of a Member State could serve as the basis for a listing: none of the sources cited in this article identify one.
• Whether Egypt and Jordan will receive, in addition to SDGT, the FTO designation: there is no notice to that effect in the Federal Register filed with this document.
• What will the Eleventh Circuit rule regarding the injunction against Executive Order 25-244 and Judge Walker’s recusal?
• What will the Eleventh Circuit rule regarding CAIR’s appeal of the November 4 order (filed on November 5, ECF 66), and whether the plaintiffs will request that the designation be stayed pending the decision.
• What did the Texas courts decide regarding the federal motion filed on January 22 and Paxton’s state lawsuit?
• Whether the Syrian People’s Assembly will vote to repeal Law No. 49 of 1980 (as of October 13, 2026, the proposal was still in the signature-gathering stage), and whether the repeal of the emergency laws of January 29, 2025, was approved.
• Unlocalized official texts: Egyptian Cabinet (2013), Saudi Press Agency (2014), Libyan Chamber (2019), Austrian Registry; the Dutch tally; the Blazakis document; the original text of Law 49 of 1980 and the Syrian People’s Assembly website.

Who designated it a terrorist organization, who banned it, and who refused to do so? Complete timeline

Four columns: date; who; what they did; status; source with its hyperlink; and number in “Sources Consulted.” All dates are marked as verified unless the cell indicates otherwise.

Sources consulted

Level 1, official and judicial sources (downloaded with a timestamp on October 14, 2026, unless otherwise noted):

1. European Parliament, Resolution P10_TA(2026)0342, “The Need for an EU Strategy to Counter Islamist Entryism and the Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood Network,” 2026/2868(RSP), October 8, 2026, official text in PDF, 10 pages, read. Read resolution
2. European Parliament, Legislative Observatory, summary of procedure 2026/2868(RSP): “adopted by a vote of 381 to 167, with 15 abstentions”; downloaded on November 7, 2026. See summary
3. Council of the European Union, Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of December 27, 2001, on the implementation of specific measures to combat terrorism, official text in English on EUR-Lex, Article 1.4; and Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 of February 26, 2026, which repeals Articles 2, 3, and 3a thereof and reproduces their substance, read in its entirety; both downloaded on November 7, 2026. Common Position · Decision 2026/455
4. European Commission, Letter C(2026) 4123 final, dated June 14, 2026, to the President of the French National Assembly, signed by Kaja Kallas and Maroš Šefčovič, 3 pages, read; hosted by the National Assembly; downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read letter
5. French National Assembly, Adopted Text No. 215, “European Resolution to Add the Muslim Brotherhood Movement to the European List of Terrorist Organizations,” January 22, 2026, full text. Read text
6. Report titled “The Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islamism in France,” available on the French Ministry of the Interior’s website, presented on May 21, 2025, to the Council for National Defense and Security; 76 pages, read in its entirety. Read report
7. U.S. Department of State, “Designations of Muslim Brotherhood Chapters,” fact sheet dated January 13, 2026. Read fact sheet
8. U.S. Department of State, statement by Secretary Marco Rubio, “Terrorist Designations of Muslim Brotherhood Chapters,” January 13, 2026. Read the statement
9. U.S. Department of State, “Designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood,” March 9, 2026. Read the statement
10. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury and State Departments Designate Muslim Brotherhood Branches as Terrorist Organizations,” January 13, 2026. Read the press release
11. Federal Register (govinfo.gov), Executive Order 14362, signed on November 24, 2025, 90 Fed. Reg. 55033. Read the order
12. Federal Register, designation of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), Doc. 2026-00573, signed on December 19, 2025, published on January 14, 2026. See notice
13. Federal Register, designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as an FTO, doc. 2026-05072, Public Notice 12967, signed on March 8, 2026, published on March 16, 2026 (“goes into effect upon publication”); HTML archived on October 14 and PDF made available for public inspection on November 7, 2026. See notice
14. Federal Register, SDGT designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, Doc. 2026-05084, Public Notice 12968, signed on March 8, 2026, published on March 16, 2026; Public inspection PDF downloaded on November 7, 2026. See notice
15. govinfo.gov, official legislative status of S.2293 (119th Congress), accessed on October 14 and rechecked on November 7, 2026 (identical record). See status
16. govinfo.gov, official legislative status of H.R. 4397 (Díaz-Balart/Moskowitz), accessed on October 14 and rechecked on November 7, 2026. See status
17. govinfo.gov, official legislative status of H.R. 3883 (Mace), accessed on October 14 and rechecked on November 7, 2026. See status
18. Office of the Governor of Texas, “Governor Abbott Designates the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR as Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” November 18, 2025. Read the press release
19. Texas Attorney General’s Office, “Attorney General Ken Paxton Sues the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR to Stop Terrorist Groups from Operating in Texas,” February 5, 2026; and the complaint, “State of Texas’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary and Permanent Injunctions,” Collin County, February 5, 2026, 32 pages, read in its entirety; both downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read press release · Read complaint
20. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, CAIR Texas et al. v. Abbott et al., 1:25-cv-01878, Document 30, Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, January 22, 2026, 21 pages; RECAP copy. Read motion
21. Docket for the same case, 1:25-cv-01878, CourtListener/RECAP, accessed October 16, 2026 (last visible entry dated June 29, 2026; no ruling on the preliminary injunction); See docket
22. Government of the United Kingdom, “Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings,” HC 679, December 17, 2015. Read the findings
23. Government of the United Kingdom, written statement by the Prime Minister to Parliament on the review, December 17, 2015. Read the statement
24. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Single Federal List of Organizations Recognized as Terrorist, Entry 7, Supreme Court Decision of February 14, 2003, GKPI 03-116, effective March 4, 2003; accessed October 14, 2026. See list
25. Austrian Symbols Act (Symbole-Gesetz), consolidated text with the amendment BGBl. I No. 2/2019 (effective March 1, 2019) and the 2021 amendment; unofficial host, declared. See text
26. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, hearing titled “Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America,” August 5, 2026. See official website
27. Lara Burns, written testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Federal Courts, Oversight, Agency Action, and Federal Rights, August 5, 2026, 42 pages. Read testimony
28. Office of Representative Mario Díaz-Balart, “Díaz-Balart and Moskowitz Reintroduce the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2025,” July 15, 2025. Read the press release
29. U.S. Department of Justice, “Federal Jury in Dallas Convicts Holy Land Foundation and Its Leaders for Providing Material Support to the Hamas Terrorist Organization,” November 24, 2008. Read the press release
30. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “Review of FBI Interactions with the Council on American-Islamic Relations,” I-2013-007R, September 2013, 41 pages. Read report
31. Letter dated April 28, 2009, from Richard C. Powers, Assistant Director of the FBI, to Senator Jon Kyl; hosted by realclearinvestigations.com (original custodian: the FBI); copy in this media outlet’s archive, from the related file on House Bill 1471; the archived PDF is an image without a text layer, and the verbatim text was cross-checked against the version in the related file on House Bill 1471. See letter
32. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et al. (NAIT appeal), No. 09-10875, October 20, 2010, 13 pages. Read the opinion
33. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. El-Mezain, No. 09-10560, December 7, 2011. Read the opinion
34. Internal memorandum from 1991, Government Exhibit 003-0085, Case No. 3:04-CR-240-G; originally held by the court, hosted by investigativeproject.org; verified by its reproduction in Burns’s testimony, pp. 6 and 7. See document
35. Office of the Governor of Florida, Executive Order 25-244, December 8, 2025; copy with provenance retrieved via fingerprint from the related file on House Bill 1471 (downloaded from there on July 8, 2026). Read order
36. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, 4:25-cv-516: Document 43, Order Granting a Preliminary Injunction by Judge Mark E. Walker, March 4, 2026, 30 pages (scope on p. 27); and Document 110, Order Dismissing the Case on October 15, 2026 (cites the Eleventh Circuit’s October 13 order, p. 2). And Document 44, the governor’s notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, March 6, 2026. RECAP copies downloaded on November 6, 2026. ECF 43 · ECF 44 · ECF 110
37. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, 4:26-cv-521 (initials AW-MAF following reassignment): Document 28, Order of October 6, 2026, denying the TRO; Exhibit 56, “Order of Disqualification,” October 15, 2026, 2 pages; docket via CourtListener/RECAP accessed October 16, 2026 (last updated 10:50 a.m.; reassigned to Robert L. Hinkle; hearing set for the 28th); and document 65, “Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction,” Presiding Judge Allen Winsor, November 4, 2026, 36 pages, cited (pp. 1, 2, 3, 6, 19, 20, 31, and 36 cited); copy of the docket dated November 5, 2026 (downward order), with entry 1 (complaint, October 1, 2026), entry 59 (text-only reassignment order, no PDF), and entry 64 (transcription notice, restriction until February 8, 2027). And Document 66, notice of the plaintiffs’ appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, November 5, 2026, 2 pages, and Document 67, notice of bond deposit, November 6, 2026, 3 pages; copies published by the ACLU and downloaded on November 7, 2026. And the first lawsuit challenging the same law, 4:26-cv-315: Document 69, order dismissing it for lack of standing, Judge Mark E. Walker, October 1, 2026, 6 pages, read; RECAP copy downloaded on November 7, 2026. ECF 28 · ECF 56 · Docket · ECF 65 · ECF 69 (4:26-cv-315) · ECF 66 · ECF 67
38. Florida Administrative Register, vol. 52, no. 194, October 6, 2026, notice of CAIR designation (p. 20); copy retrieved via trace from the sister file on House Bill 1471 (posted there on October 7, 2026). See register
39. SANA (Syrian state news agency), “Statement by the Military Operations Command Announcing the Victory of the Syrian Revolution,” Victory Press Conference, January 29, 2025, published on January 30; point 2: “the cessation of all emergency laws”; downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read the statement
40. SANA, People’s Assembly section, list accessed on November 7, 2026 (no mention of Law 49 or a vote). See section

Level 2, press, analysis centers, and reports (released on October 14, 2026, unless otherwise noted; those for Florida and Texas, in November; those for Syria, 89 through 93, on November 7, 2026):

41. The National (UAE), “List of groups designated as terrorist organizations by the UAE,” November 16, 2014. See list
42. CERIF, “The European Parliament and Muslim Brotherhood-related entryism: the resolution of October 8, 2026” and “analysis of the vote” (includes the French vote tally: 157-101-1), October 2026. Read analysis · View vote
43. Amnesty International, Urgent Action MDE 24/050/2006 on Syria and Law No. 49 of 1980. Read the document
44. Al-Monitor, “Egypt Declares the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group,” December 2013. Read article
45. Al Jazeera, “Egypt Declares the Muslim Brotherhood a ‘Terrorist Group’,” December 25, 2013. Read article
46. TIMEP, “The Muslim Brotherhood Is Officially Designated a Terrorist Organization,” December 25, 2013. Read article
47. Daily News Egypt, “Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization: Cabinet,” December 25, 2013. Read article
48. Wilson Center, “Riyadh Designates the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization,” March 10, 2014, featuring the Saudi Ministry of the Interior’s statement; date of the announcement confirmed by Global Voices, March 7, 2014. Read · Global Voices
49. Dawn, “Russia Bans 15 Religious Groups,” February 15, 2003. Read article
50. RFE/RL, “Kazakhstan Updates List of Banned Terrorist Groups,” October 12, 2006. Read article
51. Al Jazeera, “Bahrain’s Foreign Minister: The Muslim Brotherhood Is a Terrorist Group,” July 2017. Read article
52. Gulf News, “Bahrain Confirms Full Support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” March 22, 2014, featuring the foreign minister’s tweets following the press conference in Islamabad; accessed October 15, 2026. Read article
53. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sada, “Bahrain Between Its Backers and the Brotherhood,” May 20, 2014; accessed October 15, 2026. Read analysis
54. Jordan News, “Jordan Declares Muslim Brotherhood Illegal, Bans Membership, and Seizes Its Assets,” April 23, 2025; and Al-Monitor, “Jordan Bans Muslim Brotherhood Group,” April 2025. Jordan News · Al-Monitor
55. APA via Tiroler Tageszeitung, “National Council: Ban on Extremist Symbols Expanded,” December 2018. Read the article
56. Libya Security Monitor, Weekly Summary, May 8–14, 2019. Read
57. Tunisie Numérique, “Libyan Parliament Designates the Muslim Brotherhood as a Terrorist Organization,” May 14, 2019. Read article
58. CNN, “Trump Administration Explores Designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a Terrorist Group,” April 30, 2019. Read article
59. Al Jazeera, “‘Witch hunt’ fears as the U.S. may outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood,” February 1, 2017. Read article
60. Brennan Center for Justice (signatory), “Statement by 81 Civil, Human Rights, and Faith-Based Groups: Serious Concerns Regarding Harm to American Muslim Civil Society from Terrorism Designation,” February 23, 2017, 3-page PDF, read in full; downloaded on October 15, 2026. Read statement
61. HuffPost, “Muslim Brotherhood Terror Designation Will Lead to ‘Witch Hunt,’ Rights Groups Say,” February 24, 2017; accessed October 15, 2026. Read article
62. Media Alliance, later version of the same statement, titled “Statement of 82 Civil, Human Rights, and Faith-Based Groups,” June 2017; accessed October 15, 2026. See text
63. Jewish Insider, “Democrats Plan to Boycott Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on the Muslim Brotherhood,” August 2026. Read article
64. CAIR, RSS feed for press releases, accessed on October 14 and 15, 2026 (entries from October 9 to 14); on November 7, 2026, it returned a 403 error and could not be verified. See feed
65. The National, “EU Parliament Calls for Designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a Terrorist Organization,” October 8, 2026; and “EU to Increase Monitoring of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Financial Flows,” October 9, 2026. October 8 · October 9
66. Escudo Digital, “European Parliament Votes to Combat the Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood Network,” October 8, 2026. Read article
67. JNS, “EU Should Put the Muslim Brotherhood on the Terror List, European Parliament Votes,” October 8, 2026. Read article
68. Brussels Signal, “European Parliament Urges Designation of Muslim Brotherhood Networks as Terrorist Organizations,” October 9, 2026. Read article
69. EU Reporter, “European Parliament Backs EU Strategy Against Muslim Brotherhood ‘Entryism’,” October 12, 2026. Read article
70. The Jerusalem Post, “EU Parliament Adopts Resolution Calling for the Muslim Brotherhood to Be Added to the Terror List,” October 2026. Read article
71. political.org, “European Parliament votes 381-167…”, October 8, 2026. Read article
72. Egypt Today, “U.S. Welcomes EP Resolution Calling for Countering the Influence of Muslim Brotherhood Networks,” October 11, 2026; and “Egyptian Source: EU Resolution … Reflects Growing European Concerns,” October 8, 2026. October 11 · October 8
73. Khaleej Times, “UAE’s Saqr Ghobash Welcomes Call for European Strategy Against the Muslim Brotherhood,” October 12, 2026 (page publication date). Read article
74. Hespress FR, “The European Parliament Calls for a Review of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Inclusion on the Terrorist List,” October 8, 2026. Read article
75. Shafaq News, “France Pushes for EU Action Against the Muslim Brotherhood.” Read article
76. Grupo Animal (via AFP), on the U.S. designations of January 13, 2026, and the reaction of the Egyptian branch. Read article
77. War on the Rocks, Jeff Breinholt, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Limits of Terrorist Designations,” December 23, 2025. Read article
78. Council on Foreign Relations, “Blacklisting the Muslim Brotherhood: What to Know.” Read the explanation
79. Lorenzo Vidino, Program on Extremism (GWU), “The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History,” 2023. Read the study
80. Matthew Levitt, The Washington Institute, “Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad” (accessed; not cited in the text). See
81. INSS (Israel), “The U.S. Administration Against the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR: From Declarations to Action?” Read the analysis
82. Modern Diplomacy, “Florida Adds CAIR to Terrorism List, Renewing First Amendment Fight,” October 5, 2026. Read article
83. ACLU of Florida, October 2026 press release regarding the challenge to the state designation, featuring a statement by Hina Shamsi. Read the press release
84. ACLU of Florida, “CAIR and CAIR-Florida Will Appeal Federal Court Decision…,” November 5, 2026 (plaintiffs’ attorney; press release); accessed November 7, 2026. Read press release
85. Tallahassee Democrat / USA TODAY Network (Stephany Matat), via Yahoo, “Muslim group shutting down in Florida…”, November 4, 2026; accessed November 6, 2026. Read article
86. Yahoo (Tiffany Chartier), “Florida CAIR Terrorist Designation Takes Effect After Court Ruling As Texas Lawsuit Targets CAIR Chapters, Including DFW,” November 6, 2026, with a review by The Dallas Express on CAIR Action; downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read article
87. The Texas Tribune, “Ken Paxton Sues CAIR, Muslim Brotherhood…,” February 5, 2026; accessed November 7, 2026. Read article
88. Florida Phoenix, “CAIR Ends Operations in Florida as Domestic Terrorist Designation Takes Effect,” November 5, 2026 (accessed for Hiba Rahim’s statement; not cited in the body of the text). Read article
89. Asharq Al-Awsat (English), “Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return,” October 13, 2026; accessed November 7, 2026. Read article
90. Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic), on the movement to repeal the criminalization of the Brotherhood, October 13, 2026; accessed November 7, 2026. Read article
91. Al Jazeera (Arabic), text of the Syrian Constitutional Declaration, March 14, 2025 (reproduction of the text; Articles 48 and 51); downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read text
92. Majalla (Arabic), full text of the Syrian Constitutional Declaration signed on March 13, 2025 (the publication date of the page is not listed in the copy); downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read text
93. The Syrian Observer, “Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood Affirms Continuity as Independent National Group,” September 28, 2026, via Syria TV (“Source: SYRIA TV”; summary of the September 27 statement); downloaded on November 7, 2026. Read article

Disclaimer

News Miami Dade bases its coverage on original government documents: public hearings, Legistar and Granicus archives, memos from the County Attorney’s Office, recommendations from staff at the Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources, and records from the Florida Division of Elections and the Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics. Every factual claim is grounded in an identifiable primary source; statements are cited verbatim with the source when available.

In this article, the primary sources are official texts from the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission, as well as those from the French National Assembly, websites of the State Department and the Treasury, the Federal Register, govinfo.gov, Texas press releases, the British review, the Russian FSB list, Fifth Circuit opinions, FBI and Inspector General documents, and federal court records from Florida and Texas taken from the RECAP public archive. Where this article relies on press coverage rather than a primary source, it states so, and where the document could not be found, it says so in those words.

This article does not assert that any organization is or is not a terrorist organization: it attributes each designation, ban, statement, or denial to the authority that issued it, including the date and text. The characterizations of CAIR cited here come from the FBI, federal prosecutors, a witness before the Senate, the governments of Texas and Florida, and identified scholars, and are presented alongside the court rulings and analyses that qualify them; nor did the federal court in Florida rule on this matter on November 4, 2026. This does not constitute legal advice or a criminal, ethical, or judicial determination of its own.

Stay up to date with the latest news!

Forty-six years of lists, laws, court rulings, and denials—document by document—covering the two legal thresholds applied by Brussels and Washington and what they mean for the law that Florida has been enforcing since November 5. At News Miami-Dade, we’re following the entire case.

👉 Click here!

Don’t miss a single detail. #MiamiDade #Florida #MuslimBrotherhood #CAIR #EuropeanUnion